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Resh, William G. Rethinking the administrative presidency: trust, intellectual capital, and appointeecareerist
relations in the George W. Bush administration. Johns Hopkins, 2015. 190p bibl index afp ISBN 9781421418490,
$44.95; ISBN 9781421418506 ebook, $44.95.
A great deal of fine work has been done examining the administrative tools of presidents and how their managerial reach
has, in recent decades, expanded their power. Resh (Univ. of Southern California) takes a different approach to the
administrative presidency, focusing on the second term of the George W. Bush presidency and looking closely at the
connection between appointed (political) and career (bureaucratic) executives. The author finds that efforts at political
control often harm agency performance. Part of the problem is that presidents and their top appointees “commonly start
from the premise of distrust when they attempt to control agencies.” Resh is absolutely correct: most presidents enter office
seeing the permanent government as a hostile enemy bent on undermining the president’s goals. This distrust matters as it
is soon reciprocated. This is an outstanding book, but it is for a limited audience. Its second half is methodologically
sophisticated, of a style more often found in academic journals requiring the skills of a specialist to understand, and is not
for the weak of heart or amateur reader.
M. A. Genovese, Loyola Marymount University
Summing Up: Highly recommended. Graduate and research collections.

